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The idea that science explains or ought to explain every phenomenon finds Cartesian dualism of mind and body to be an unsatisfactory thesis. Consequently we have a 
variety of materialist theories regarding mind and consciousness. 
As Howard Robinson notes: "If science cannot encompass the 
subjective then subjectivity becomes a door through which 
mystical, irrational and religious notions can enter and reassert 
themselves against the modern metaphysic of scientific realism." 
(Robinson 1982 : 2). Thus in recent times, we come across many 
philosophers who are committed to the scientific world picture, 
trying to locate mind within a world that is essentially physical. 
The central problems these philosophers have to tackle consist of 
consciousness and mental causation.
The pioneers of 'Physicalism' like Place and Smart opine that 
there are no inner mental processes such as thought and images. 
Inspired by the advance in physical theories about natural 
phenomena, they hold that though behaviourist account of 
sensation is wrong, a true physicalist account of the same is
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possible. Their approach to the mental has been known as 
'C entral-state m aterialism ' or 'M ind-body identity theory. 
According to Place, sensations are nothing but the process in the 
brain just as lightning is the motion of electrical charges. Though 
statements about lightning do not mean the same as statements 
about electrical charges, it is a contingent matter of fact that 
lightning is the motion of electrical charges. Similarly, Place thinks 
that it is a contingent matter of fact that sensations are brain 
processes. In his view, it is the phenomenological fallacy that 
com m its m any p hilosophers to think otherw ise. The 
phenomenological fallacy consists in thinking that, for example, 
having a green after-image is over and above the normal 
experiences we have when we look at a green patch of light. 
There is no thing as an 'after-image' beyond the experience of 
imaging something. These experiences are identical with brain 
processes. Smart provides a topic-neutral analysis of the same. 
According to him, when a person says "I see a yellowish-orange 
after-image/' what he says is that there is something going on 
which is like what is going on when he has his eyes open and is 
awake and he sees an orange. Thus the "something" that is going 
on is being described only in terms of a stimulus that normally 
brings it about. Smith then identifies this something with a brain 
process.
Place-Smart view of physicalism had a set back with 'multiple 
realisation' argument first advanced by Hilary Putnam (Putnam 
1975) that set the stage for 'Functionalism'. The central thesis of 
functionalism is that mental kinds are functional kinds. To the 
extent how one construes the relation between functionalism ond 
physicalism, there can be two types of functionalism, namely 
'functional state identity theory' and 'functional specification 
theory'. If it is argued that functionalism does not support 
physicialism and that physicalism is not a true account of mind, 
we have functional state identity theory. On the other hand, if it 
is argued that functionalism supports physicalism, which is a 
true account of mind, we have functional specification theory. 
Armstrong and Lewis, who champion Type physicalism' think 
that functionalism does support physicalism. According to them, 
the mental state 'pain' is a functionally specified physical state. 
Functional specification theory argues that a mental state is that 
which is connected with a certain causal role. Causal roles are 
specified by definite descriptions and mental states are considered
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as the referents of these definite descriptions. For Armstrong and 
Lewis these descriptions are brain states, "...if the concepts of the 
various sorts of mental state are concepts of that which is, in 
various sorts of way, apt for causing certain effects and apt for 
being the effect of certain causes, then it would be a quite 
unpuzzling thing if mental states should turn out to be physical 
states of the brain." (Armstrong 1981 : 21) The particular causal 
role differs for different sorts of mental states . The causes of 
mental states are objects or events in the person's environment. 
Nevertheless, the identification of mental states with brain states 
poses problems for the physicalist as far as secondary qualities are 
concerned. Armstrong proposes a purely objectivist account of the 
secondary qualities. For example, perceived or felt heat of objects 
is identified with the motion of the molecules of the hot object. 
Thus colours, sounds, tastes, smells and the like are taken to 
qualify physical objects or surfaces and identified with properties 
that are discovered by scientific investigations to be correlated 
with the so called secondary qualities. The rationale behind such 
theoretical identification is that ontologically complex properties 
may be grasped epistemologically as simple and unanalysable.
A rm strong's account of secondary qualities preclude the 
perception of any real properties. Since science has no place for 
secondary qualities, Armstrong suggests that when we perceive 
a Secondary quality we are not aware of a real quality at a l l . "We 
know nothing about what redness is in its own nature.... We only 
know contingent truths about redness — such truths as that it is 
a property detected by the eye and possessed... by such things as 
the surface of ripe tomatoes and Jonathan apples." (Armstrong 
1968 : 275). Thus, according to him, science has to tell us what 
real, primary qualities an object possesses when we call it red. As 
Robinson points out, Armstrong is treating secondary qualities in 
a manner of "resemblance." Armstrong accepts that perceiving a 
thing only in terms of its resemblance relation gives us no idea 
about the intrinsic nature of the quality. This seems to be quite 
acceptable to Armstrong as in the final analysis, there are no 
secondary qualities for him. But this will inevitably lead him to 
deny the perception of any real qualities at all. " . . .  If all our 
perception is simply the recognition of resemblances, then we 
will know' nothing about the intrinsic nature of any perceivable 
qualities... By his own standards, it would seem that Armstrong 
cannot allow that we ever perceive any real properties at all: our
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grasp of the nature of every empirical quality is as empty as our 
direct grasp of the real understanding nature of secondary 
qualities." (Robinson 1982 : 50) Armstrong himself admits that 
the nature of secondary qualities is problematic for physicalists. 
(Armstrong 1983)
According to Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor, functionalism does 
not support physicalism, rather it refutes type physicalism. They 
describe the relation between mental properties and physical 
properties in terms of 'realisation' or 'implementation/ Putnam 
conceives functionalism to be an alternative to the view that 
mental states are physico-chemical states of the brain. Though he 
concedes that there obtains an identity, he says the central state 
identity theorists were wrong in assuming the other term of 
identity in the neurological properties of the brain. According to 
him, the brain has properties which are in a sense not physical. 
That is, brain has "properties which are definable in terms that 
do not mention the brain's physics or chemistry." (Putnam 1981 : 
78) Analogous to a computer programme that can be realised by 
a system quite different from what its metaphysical or ontological 
com position, mental properties can be realised variously. 
"Psychological properties exhibit the same characteristic, the 
same psychological property (e.g. being angry) can be property 
of members of thousands of different species which may have 
quite different physics and chem istry...." (Putnam 1981 : 79) 
Thus functionalists like Putnam hold that psychological properties 
are identical with functional properties. For Putnam, psychological 
functional states are logical states. He argues out his position by 
conceiving the mental in terms of a machine analogue. It 
characterises a mental state in terms of its relation to inputs, 
outputs and other states. The set of conditionals or the programme 
specifies the relational structure for each mental state. The relations 
between the entries on the machine table are logical and not 
causal. A programme can be realised in a variety of ways and the 
realisation of the programme is a realisation of a system of 
psychological states. Thus, for functionalists, it is absurd to ask 
what psychological states are — as absurd as to ask what the 
states described by a machine programme are. (Levin 1979) Fodor 
accepts much of the functionalist perspective of Putnam and 
develops a cognitivist approach to the mental. He allows the 
existence of mental causes and the interaction of mental states 
with one another without subscribing to the substance dualism of
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Descartes on the one hand and without accepting the physicalist 
identification of the mental with the brain states on the other. We 
call a valve-lifting device a camshaft when it is fitted in an 
automobile. The same functional role is played by a muscle in the 
human heart. Thus being a valve-lifter is a functional state a thing 
satisfies not because of what it is, but because of what it does.
According to Fodor, cognitive activities are realised in mental 
representations or symbol manipulations. He rejects the notion of 
mind as a 'mirror of nature/ that is, rejects "resemblance7 as a 
property of mental representation. For him, the symbols of mind 
are abstract entities. He admits that it is inadequate to characterise 
the language of thought as just a formal medium of symbol 
manipulation. Nevertheless, he is pessimistic about our ability to 
understand the way in which the content is dealt, with by our 
computational systems. Though semantics is inaccessible to the 
cognitivist, he says that "to deny that mental operations have 
access to semantic properties of mental representation is not to 
deny that mental operations have aceesaste semantic properties." 
(Fodor 1981 : 244) Thus, as investigators we are to be contended 
with describing the kinds of syntactic operations that are carried 
out and have to remain ignorant of the ways in which these 
operations refer to the external world. He thinks that these are 
inaccessible to scientific investigations. According to Fodor, all 
thcit we can hope for is only a computational psychology, a 
psychology of formal mental operations and not a naturalistic 
psychology that aims at explaining the way we learn about the 
particular things of the world. He calls his syntactic approach to 
cognition as "Methodological solipsism" -  the claim that how the 
world is makes no difference to one's mental states. Though 
mental states play a causal role in behaviour, this role is more 
dependent on how it actually is.
*■
Hubert L. Dreyfus characterises Husserl as an advocate of 
computational model of cognition in the manner of Fodor. 
However a critical look at Hussertian phenomenology would 
show, as Ronald McIntyre had shown, that Husserl and Fodor 
differ significantly though they agree in certain respects. For 
Husserl, the intentionality of consciousness gives mental states a 
sort of independence from the reality of what is represented. A 
mental state may represent an object that actually does not exist 
and when it does exit, the representation need not coincide with
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the properties it actually has. This version of methodological 
solipsism leads Husserl to transcendental phenomenology. For 
Husserl, " . . .  A philosophical understanding of the foundations 
of beliefs about natural reality must ultimately derive from a 
study of mental representation, and so that study itself cannot be 
dependent on the truth of those beliefs". (McIntyre 1988 : 59) 
Thus Husserl, like Fodor, holds that we have no access to reality 
except through our mental representations. Moreover Husserlian 
phenomenology can be considered as a precursor to functionalism. 
The ontologically neutral approach of the functionalists is explicitly 
articulated in Husserl's works. Like functionalism, the goal of 
phenomenology is to provide abstract analyses of what is involved 
in various mental activities. Phenomenological descriptions are 
not naturalistic accounts of the embodied ego, rather they are 
philosophical accounts of transcendental features of mind. As 
noted before, Fodor's mental representations are mental symbols 
having syntactic and semantic structures like natural languages. 
More importantly, Fodor holds that natural language is the 
"expression of thought" as the syntactic and semantic properties 
of natural language are derived from more fundamental systems 
of mental representations. Husserl's mental representations are 
not mental symbols in this sense. 'Noemaiic Sinne' are not linguistic 
entities that have meaning, but are meanings themselves. As 
McIntyre puts it. " On Fodor's version... we think in mental 
words that get translated into a public language when we speak 
or write, while on Husserl's version we think in "meanings" that 
get expressed in a public language. " (McIntyre 1988 : 65)
In order to explicate the semantic aspects of mental representation, 
Fodor offers a causal theory of linguistic reference. That is, for 
Fodor the relation between language and the world is causal. In 
the same manner, he holds that referential properties of mental 
representations are causal relations. Thus Fodor analyses particular 
mental event types into functional states defined by causal 
relations among beliefs, desires etc. and reference relations to 
extra-mental things defined by causal relation between internal 
states and the external world. His "methodological solipsism" 
separates these two analyses.
Husserl conceives intentionality or representational relation of 
mental states as inherent in the mental state itself, independent 
of its casual relations to extra-mental things. In Husserlian
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phenomenology "... the reference relations between experiences 
and their objects do not reduce to causal relations, since intentional 
relations involve the ob ject's satisfying the contents of 
experience.... H usserl conceived contents as intrinsically 
conceptual entities or meanings (sinne), and as object's satisfying 
a meaning is not a causal relation." (Smith 1995 : 369) So, Husserl 
would desist from Fodor's characterisation of representational 
nature of the mental in causal relations.
H usserl holds that the sam e events are d escribed  in 
phenomenology and various physical or psychological theories 
in different ways. In assuming an ontology of essences and 
moments, Husserl distinguishes different moments of the mental 
events themselves, assigning different sciences to the study of 
different aspects of the events. Thus phenomenology studies 
intentionality as the property of pure consciousness, psychology 
studies it as property of mental events in nature, that is as acts of 
embodied consciousness whereas neurophysiological sciences 
view it as a property of brain processes. So Husserl would not 
agree with Cartesian dualistic metaphysics.
There can be three basic positions on the mind-body problem: 
substance dualism, property dualism, and property monism. 
(Levin 1979). According to substance dualism, there are both 
mental and physical entities. It implies there are non-physical or 
psychical properties. One may deny substance dualism by holding 
property dualism or property monism. Property dualism claims 
that there are only physical entities, but some physical entities 
have both physical and non-physical, psychological properties. 
Property monism asserts that there are only physical entities, and 
all properties of physical entities are physical. Physicalist theories 
of mind as we have seen belong to property monism. Husserl 
would argue against such a thesis as according to him qualitative 
mental states can be conceived independently of the physical 
states. Hence physicalism that identifies mental states with neural 
states cannot be true. Functionalism and double-aspect theories 
are brands of property dualism. When a functionalist like Fodor 
says that mental events and brain events are type distinct and 
only token identical, it means that the same events realise both 
mental and physical types. Nevertheless, when Fodor goes on to 
characterise the representational nature of the mental in causal 
relations, Husserl parts company with him. According to Husserl,
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causal categories are strictly speaking a relation in nature and 
thus cannot account for acts of consciousness or mental states.
Donald Davidson's "Anomalous monism" is a version of double­
aspect theory. As against the traditional theory, the modern 
version of double-aspect theory does not say that all substances 
are physical, while some of its properties may be non-physical. 
Their claim is rather that all "events" are physical, though some 
events have irreducible psychical aspect. According to Davidson, 
causal explanations must be strictly nomological, but explanations 
with reference to mental states cannot be so because the mental is 
anomalous. (Davidson 1986). However the occurrence of any 
mental event is a physical event for him and evey event which 
has a causal explanation has complete physical explanation. 
Thus Davidson holds that mental events are identical with 
physical events. He hastens to add that there are no bridge laws 
that connect the mental with the physical. "Anomalous monism 
resembles materialism in its claim that all events are physical, 
but reject the thesis, usually considered essential to materialism, 
that mental phenomena can be given purely physical explanations. 
(Davidson 1986: 214). From the perspective of Husserl, events in 
themselves are neither mental nor physical, "...physical theory 
captures certain essential features of those events, features 
belonging with the essence Nature. And phenomenological theory 
captures other essential features of those same events, notably 
intentionality, belonging with the essence Consciousness". (Smith 
1995:363) Husserl envisages an ontology of tripartite 'Essence' or 
'Region,' namely Nature, Life-world, and Consciousness. These 
essences are not reducible to any one essence as there are no 
bridge laws available. The Plurality of essences are unbridgable 
by laws of essence. Does it mean then our understanding of the 
'mental' or 'consciousness' is ever going to remain at the subjective 
level? Would there be a science of the 'mental'? A reading of 
Husserl in the light of Nagel's view may lead us to answer this 
question in the affirmative.
Thomas Nagel argues against the various reductionist theories 
that aim to analyse the mental in terms of the physical. As he 
says, "If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological 
features must themselves be given a physical account. But when 
we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result 
is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is
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essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems 
inevitable that an objective physical theory will abandon that 
point of view."(Nagel 1974 : 437) The point of view in question 
has nothing to do with privacy of experience, it is not one 
accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is objective in the 
sense that intersubjectivity allows one to know the quality of 
another's experience. Still they are subjective as the objective 
ascription of experience is possible only by adopting the other's 
point of view. Nagel makes it very clear when he says, "M y 
point, however, is not that we cannot know  what it is like to be a 
bat. I am not raising the epistemological problem. My point is 
rather that even to form a conception of what it is like to be a 
bat... one must take up the bat's point of view."(Nagel 1974 : 
442) If the facts about experiencing are accessible only from the 
subjective viewpoint then characterising such experiences in a 
physicalist idiom seems to be an elusive task. Nevertheless, 
Nagel thinks it is not something impossible. The challenge before 
us is to form new concepts and devise a new method that 
permits an objective phenomenology. "W hat we need is not a 
reductionist or eliminative revision but an expansionist one... a 
conception that will permit subjective points of view to have an 
objective physical character in themselves."(Nagel 1998 : 343) 
Nagel echoes Husserl when he says that such a new concept will 
be captured as evidenced by the history of science. Science 
develops new concepts about the same things, retaining most of 
the features of the old concepts and relating these to new concept 
thereby making it possible to explore further connections. As 
Nagel says, we never had logical, geometrical , and arithmetical 
concepts till we developed those.
According to Husserl, science is a product of human praxis like 
any other cultural fact. It is a continuous process that arises 
within human space through human activity, "...[science] is not 
only a mobile forward process from one set of acquisitions to 
another but a continuous synthesis in which all acquisitions 
maintain their validity, all make up a totality such that, at every 
present stage, the total acquisition is, so to speak, the total 
premise for the acquisitions of new level." (Husserl 1970 : 355- 
356) Science takes shape by way of abstractions and concept 
formations or idealisations from the pre-scientific life-world. The 
crisis of modern science, according to Husserl, is that it has 
severed its relation to the life-world. 'The crisis of western
sciences does not concern their technical validity. What is in 
question is the meaning of the sciences in a philosophical sense 
and, no less important, their human significance...Science, it 
seems, has nothing to say as to things that matter most for 
human existence." (Gurwitsch 1956 : 383) Nevertheless, the Crisis 
supplementary text obliterates the gulf between the life-world 
and the scientific world. There Husserl writes that our concept of 
life-world gets expanded and merges with the scientific world, 
" ...th e  very contrast that Husserl belaboured, namely, that 
between the life-world and the scientific world, between concrete 
and objective accomplishments become sedimented, presupposed 
and habitual, the life-world itself integrates scientific truths and 
becomes expanded. (Steinbock 1994 : 565) This particular rendition 
of Husserl is strikingly similar to the proposal that Nagel makes: 
a conception of subjective points of view having objective physical 
characteristics. Nagel reiterates that " ...e v e n  though no 
transparent and direct explanatory connection is possible between 
the physiological and phenomenological, but only an empirically 
established extensional correlation. We may hope and ought to 
try as part of a scientific theory of mind to form a third conception 
that does directly entail both the mental and the physical, and 
through which their actual necessary connection with one another 
can therefore become transparent to us". (Nagel 1998 : 351-352) 
Thus Nagel's proposal that the "mental states have a tripartite 
essence," namely, phenomenological, functional, and physiological 
corresponds to Husserlian position that mental events have 
different moments that are being studied in different sciences. 
Yet, a comprehensive understanding of the 'mental' calls for a 
new science; for Husserl it was the "rigorous science of 
phenomenology," for Nagel it is a science yet to be born.
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